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The new Netherlands model Investment Agreement (19 October 2018, hereinafter New Model 
IA) is commendable for several innovations. Laudable changes include Article 2(2), Article 5(3), 
Articles 6 and 7, referring respectively to the host states’ right to regulate, business-related human 
rights, sustainable development and corporate social responsibility. The drafters should be 
credited for having included these issues in the treaty texts. Regrettably, many of these provisions 
are drafted in hortatory jargon, whose legal implications remain at best ambiguous. For reasons 
of space, this position paper is confined to selected issues and does not provide a comprehensive 
assessment of the New Model IA. 
 
AN UNJUSTIFIABLE ASYMMETRIC SYSTEM 
Overall, the New Model IA falls short of balancing the private interests of foreign investors with 
the public interest of the host state and its constituencies. Numerous scholars have criticized the 
asymmetry characterizing the great bulk of international investment agreements.1 By now there is 
a wealth of evidence showing how foreign investments may negatively affect local communities 
and how investors are able to influence the public policy of host countries.2 In light of this thick 
body of evidence, it is imperative that new investment agreements, including the New Model IA, 
establish enforceable obligations for investors.  
 
In this respect, Article 7(1) of the New Model BIT introduces obligations for investors, 
particularly in relation to compliance with domestic laws and regulation of the host state. Article 
7(4) introduces a liability rule for the investor ‘in accordance with the rules concerning 
jurisdiction of their home state’, which could allegedly be seen as a rule on enforcement. While 
the rule establishing obligations for investors, as per Article 7(1), is a key and commendable 
innovation of the New Model IA and should be kept, the formulation of Article 7(4) is 
redundant, failing to provide an effective avenue for enforcement for at least two reasons. First 
and foremost, the rules concerning jurisdiction in the home state are far from clear and often 
lead to a forum non conveniens. In some cases investors were granted access to justice through 
investment arbitration disputes (and occasionally awarded multi-millions dollars damages), 
whereas the alleged victims remained unapologetically without effective access to justice under 
domestic law.3 Secondly, even when the investor home state would grant jurisdiction for investor 
liability, the investor still retains the right to seize an arbitral tribunal of a parallel investor-host 
State dispute. Victims remain without voice before an arbitration tribunal, whose decisions are 
arguably more easily and widely enforceable than decisions of host states’ domestic courts.    
 
To make the obligations of investors effectively enforceable, the New Model IA could be 
reformed as following. 4  
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1. The scope of application of the Agreement should be broadened so as to apply also to 
the conduct of investors. A comma could be added in Article 2 to this end. 
2. Article 7(1) should include among the mandatory obligations of investors also those set 
out in Part II of the UN Guiding Principles on Business and Human Rights, which are 
the most widely consented set of obligations for businesses operating in foreign 
jurisdictions. 
3. In order to make the obligations of investors enforceable, a provision should be added, 
so as to grant jurisdiction to the arbitral tribunal established under the treaty to hear 
disputes initiated by host states, as well as individuals or groups of individuals, claiming 
to be negatively affected by a violation of investors' obligations. This could be achieved 
by modifying the text of Article 16(1). As to the consent of investors to arbitration, this 
could be linked to her decision to invest in the territory of the other Contracting Party. 
If the investor explicitly refuses to consent to arbitration, she should loose all the rights 
to initiate a dispute under the Agreement. In this respect, it is noted that one of first 
economic partnership agreements between the Netherlands and Indonesia already 
included a provision that made the right to initiate disputes possible also for host states.5   
4. Article 16(2) on the limits to the tribunal jurisdiction should be expanded so as to apply 
not only to investors’ conduct when the investment is established, but throughout all the 
phases of the investment, including the post-establishment phase. 
5. Access to treaty-based arbitration should be made conditional on exhaustion of domestic 
legal remedies. 
6. A provision should be added to grant the right to host states and individuals (or groups 
of individuals) to raise counterclaims and join proceedings. 
7. The costs of the arbitration proceeding should be regulated, so as to make arbitration 
truly accessible to local communities and to less-wealthy host states. 
 
INVESTMENT PROTECTION  
Some of the provisions relating to investment protection remain ambiguous and can be abused 
by investors. Article 9(4), for example, reiterates a much-contested jargon on ‘legitimate 
expectations’ accruing to investors as a consequence of specific representations made by one of 
the Contracting Parties. One of the serious problems with this wording is that a Contracting 
party could make specific representations to investors to the detriment of the public interest of 
the host country, and it could do so without involving potentially affected local communities. In 
those cases, people in the host country would see their rights trumped because of the ‘legitimate 
expectations’ accruing to investors. From years of investment disputes, it is clear that these terms 
can be used, amongst other things, to frustrate communities’ rights to a healthy environment, 
rights to land, etc.. For these reasons, it is here recommended to remove Article 9(4) from the 
Agreement. In this respect, it is also noted that Article 9(3) allows for unchecked reforms of the 
Contracting Party’s obligation to provide fair and equitable treatment; it appears unwarranted to 
leave the reform of such critical rule to a joint interpretative declaration. 
 
The New Model IA is also problematic in so far as it establishes an umbrella clause in its Article 
9(5). This typology of provisions has been contested and it is considered at odds with human 
rights-compatible investment treaties. Most new (model) investment agreements do not contain 
such clauses, including CETA. It is accordingly recommended to take out Article 9(5) from the 
current text. Finally, it is advisable to add an explicit sentence in Article 9 to clarify that this 
Article is to be read within the limits of what is provided in Article 2(2) of the Agreement. 
 
All in all, and despite some praiseworthy improvements, the New Model IA, as currently drafted, 
fails to correct the serious deficiencies characterizing international investment law.  
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